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U Rules and Discretion in
Monetary Policy
HOULD MONETARY POLICY be determined
by a legislated rule or by a monetary authority’s
discretion? Henry Simons (1936) first raised this
issue as a choice between rules and authorities,
terms little different than those used in recent
discussions. He stresses the value of a rule, such
as a law, instead of reliance on an authority’s
discretion because “definite, stable, legislative
rules of the game as to money are of paramount
importance to the survival of a system based on
freedom of enterprise.” Though Simons men-
tions that laws can change and therefore a rule
does not eliminate uncertainty about monetary
legislation, his principal focus is the undesirabili-
ty of delegating power to a monetary authority
with a mandate to pursue only very broad
goals. Others, for example Modigliani (1977),
have argued that monetary policy conducted by
just such an expert monetary authority will en-
hance the economy’s performance.
Proposed rules would restrict the Federal
Reserve’s discretion in various ways. Simons ar-
gued that the Federal Reserve be required to
keep the price level constant rather than be left
to pursue other possible goals. Some proposed
rules embody far more radical change in the
U.S. monetary system. One rule espoused by
some is a constant growth rate of the money
stock.’ With reserve requirements fixed and the
discount rate tied to open~marketinterest rates
by law, the only judgment necessary at the Fed-
eral Reserve would be the open~marketpur~
chases of government securities necessary to
generate the mandated growth of the money
stock. Another proposed rule would fix the level
of the monetary base.’ With this rule, it would
be possible to eliminate any discretion at the
Federal Reserve completely. What are the impli-
cations of such radical changes?
The purpose of this article is to provide a
guide to the current state of the debate on
rules discretion. The focus of this article is the
basic issue: What are the implications of a rule
that commits future monetary policy, thereby
limiting the monetary authority’s ability to
respond to changes in the economy?4
RULES VS. DISCRETION
Discussions of rules and discretion sometimes
use seemingly similar) but not identical, defini~
tions of the terms. Any discussion of rules and
‘See Simons (1936), p. 33~
‘See Friedman (1959) and Lucas (1980).
‘See Wallace (19Th.
4The debate about rules vs. discretion in monetary policy
has a long and interesting history, summarized by Argy
(1988) and Carlson (1988). There is also substantial litera-
ture on the implementation of monetary policy and the im-
plications for rules, much of it in this Review Goodhart
(1989) presents a detailed analysis of the implementation of
monetary policy. The long-standing contrast between the
mortetarist case for rules and the alternative case for
stabilization policy is summarized in Mayer (1978).4
discretion requires care in using these terms, as
well as other seemingly obvious terms such as
policy.
Policy and Its Instruments
What does the term policy mean? In this arti-
cle, policy means a plan of action or a strategy.
A policy may either be the outcome of some
process or it may be a plan designed specifically
to further some goal. In either case, dynamic
aspects of the economy are sufficiently impor-
tant that no sensible strategy can treat events
each day, month or year as independent. For
example, suppose that the goal is to have zero
inflation. The current inflation rate is affected
by expectations of future inflation, which in
turn depend on expectations of current and fu-
ture policy actions. As this simple example illus-
trates, any policy must consider current and
future implications of both current and future
actions.
A policy requires instruments to implement it.
Policy instruments are the tools manipulated to
produce the desired outcomes. The primary in
strument of monetary policy in the United
States today is open-market purchases and sales
of government securities. Additional instruments
include changes in required reserve ratios and
changes in the discount rate.
Any particular value of the instruments on
any particular date can be consistent with many
different policies. Only in the context of expect-
ed future actions can the values of instruments
be considered part of a coherent policy. It is
common to refer to current monetary policy as
the values of indicators of the monetary
authority’s actions this week, perhaps the federal
funds rate or the growth of the monetary base.
This usage is inconsistent with the definition of
policy as a plan though, because the current
and future implications of today’s values of in-
struments or related indicators are clear only in
the context of some expected future actions.
Rules and Discretion
what is a discretionary monetary policy? Un-
der discretion, a monetary authority is free to
act in accordance with its own judgment. For
example, if legislation directed the Federal
Reserve to do its best to improve the economy’s
performance and gave the monetary authority
the instruments that it has, the Federal Reserve
would have a discretionary monetary policy.
Tn the context of monetary policy, a rule is a
restriction on the monetary authority’s discre-
tion. A rule involves the exercise of control over
the monetary authority in a way that restricts
the monetary authority’s actions. Rules can
directly limit the actions taken by a monetary
authority. For example, one simple possible rule
would be that the monetary authority hold the
monetary base constant. This clearly restricts
the use of judgment. A rule need not be as sim-
ple as that though. Rules can attempt to limit
the objectives pursued by the monetary authori-
ty. For example, one possible rule would be that
the monetary authority announce a target for
monetary base growth over some period to fur-
ther some well-defined goal and then to hit the
target unless predetermined exceptional circum-
stances arise.
Though a rule imposed by legislation or even
constitutionally would be subject to revision, in-
frequent changes in the rule relative to firms’
and households’ expectations and decisions
make policy more predictable. This would be
true even if the application of the rule in a par-
ticular instance were sometimes unclear be-
cause of ambiguity about the state of the world.
The problem facing the monetary authority
would be to determine the particular state of
the world — for example, whether the economy
is in a recession. The rule then would deter-
mine the particular choices of the values of the
instruments.
Most proposed rules restrict the monetary
authority’s discretion hut do not eliminate it. Si-
mons (1936) proposed a rule that the monetary
authority keep the price level constant. Though
this rule would restrict the monetary authority’s
discretion, the authority could still exercise sub-
stantial discretion in pursuing this goal. Even
with the choice of the particular price index de-
termined and even if the monetai’y authority
had only one possible instrument, perhaps the
monetary base, the authority would still have to
estimate the growth rate of the monetary base
consistent with a constant price level.’ This esti-
mate requires a forecast of the demand for the
‘This restriction to the monetary base as the single instru-
ment could be accomplished by eliminating the discount
rate and changes in reserve requirements as instruments
and making some technical changes in the relationship be-
tween the Federal Reserve and the Treasury.monetary base at zero inflation, which almost
inevitably requires judgment. Similarly, a rule
that the monetary authority keep the growth
rate of the money stock constant at, say, 4 per-
cent per year can allow substantial judgment
about the way to hit the target. Even a rule re-
quiring the monetary authority to keep the
growth rate of the monetary base constant at 4
percent could allow some choice of instruments
or of timing. Nonetheless, it is possible to have
rules that allow no discretion under any cir-
cumstances. If the monetary authority has only
one instrument, a rule that the monetary base
grow at 4 percent per year can eliminate dis-
cretion
The Issues
There are two leading arguments concerning
the desirability of rules or discretion. The first
is the desirability of having elected representa-
tives make choices Simons’ (1936) choice was
for monetary policy largely determined by elect-
ed representatives rather than by a monetary
authority. Pat’t of this conclusion is based on a
particular set of values: a preference for mone-
tary policy made by elected representatives
rather than by experts subject to looser control
by the electorate or their representatives.’ On
the other hand, others have argued that expert
economic judgment can contribute to better
policy!
The other leading argument concerns the
economy’s performance under rules and under
discretion — that is, the economic implications
of committing policy. This argument has two
components. The first component is whether,
even if policy actions usually would be the same
with or without a rule, there are benefits or
costs of committing policy. The second compo-
nent is whether, given the current state of eco-
nomic knowledge, policy actions that depend on
the current state of the economy are likely to
improve the economy’s performance. These two
components of the economic implications of
committing policy are closely related. If judg-
ments based on the state of the economy are
unlikely to improve the economy’s performance,
there is little cost of committing policy.
5
COMMITTING POLICY
A common observation 13 or so years ago
was that discretion could be used to produce
the same values of the policy instruments as
would he feasible with any restriction; hence a
rule could not improve on discretion. For exam-
ple, if a constant growth rate of the money
stock were desirable, as Friedman advocated, a
monetary authority exercising discretion could
produce this outcome.’ Furthermore, as Tur-
novsky (1977, p. 331) noted, “with one exception
- [a constant value of the instrumenti is never
optimal; that is a judiciously chosen discretion-
ary policy will always be superior” According
to this view, because a discretionary policy can
produce the same values of the instruments as
a rule, a discretionary policy can he no worse
than a rule and in fact can even be better.
Time Consistency of Policy
In their analyses of the “time consistency of
policy,” Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo
(1978) show that this general argument against
rules is wrong. Consistent with Turnovsky’s
analysis, suppose that the monetary authority
sets the instrument each period based on what
seems like the best thing to do starting today.’
Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978), and
Barro and Gordon (1983b) show that such a
policy can result in worse outcomes than will
result from a rule determining current and fu-
ture monetary policy. That is, when the econo-
my adjusts to this method of determining
monetary policy given the monetary authority’s
incentives, the economy’s actual performance
can be worse with discretion than with a rule.
There can be a positive return to committing
policy because committing future policy can
have substantial effects on the economy today.
Any economic policy implemented today takes
past expectations as given, which may seem
harmless and possibly even desirable. Suppose,
as seems safe, that people’s actions today de-
pend on their expectations of the future. In any
model of the economy, doing the best that can
be done starting today yields a path of the in-
struments for this period and the future. This
path starting from today takes past expecta-
‘Simons (1936, p. 340) wanted to prevent ‘discretionary (dic- 7See Modigliani (1977).
tatorial, arbitrary) action by an independent monetary ‘See Friedman (1959)
authority.” Among others, Lucas (1980) indicates a prefer- -
ence for the electorate’s greater involvement in monetary ‘Pindyck (1973) is one example of such sequential optimiza-
policy- tion with an estimated model,6
tions, which are history, as given. If the model
is run again next period to get a new path, the
values of the instruments for next period may
be different from those on today’s path even if
the state of the economy next period is exactly
the same as the one predicted today. This
difference in the values of the instruments oc-
curs because the policy implemented next peri-
od will not consider the effect of that policy on
today’s expectations. Today’s expectations are
history next period. Nonetheless, today’s expec-
tations of future policy will affect the economy
today and in the future.
If policy is not committed, the monetary
authority can have an incentive to generate a
surprise, a difference between what people ex-
pected to prevail and the actual outcome. In
some circumstances, households would be bet-
ter off if the monetary authority could generate
such a surprise without affecting people’s expec-
tations for the future. This caveat, however, is
critical for the veracity of the observation. Tt is
easier to see the issues in a simple, extreme fis-
cal policy example than in a monetary policy
example.
Suppose that a government imposed a one-
time tax on capital to pay off all government
debt. Further, suppose that firms and house-
holds had never thought of such a tax and that
the government somehow could guarantee with
certainty that it would never again impose such
a tax. If such circumstances were possible, this
capital levy could make firms and households
better off compared to the alternative of paying
positive marginal tax rates on income to finance
interest on the government debt.’°‘T’he gains
from imposing this capital levy would come
from the disappearance of efficiency losses as-
sociated with positive tax rates to pay interest
on the debt. On the other hand, if the tax were
announced before it was imposed, the capital
stock would be affected because saving and in-
vestment would fall in anticipation of the levy.
This would have its own efficiency losses. Fur-
thermore, if people’s expectations for the future
were affected, the possibility of a similar capital
levy would affect future saving and would have
its own efficiency losses as well.
If the government has an incentive to impose
such a capital levy and such a tax can be im-
posed, the likelihood that the tax will be imposed
affects saving and investment. Firms’ and house-
holds’ responses to the possibility of such a tax
being imposed can make people worse off even
if the tax never is imposed. Tf it were possible
to restrict the government from imposing such
a tax, there would be no efficiency losses
caused by savers’ fear that such a tax would be
imposed.
A similar argument can be made about mone-
tary policy. Suppose that the monetary authori-
ty has an incentive to generate unexpected
inflation. The monetary authority may have an
incentive to lower the government’s real debt
by increasing inflation above what holders of
the debt expected when they bought the debt.
With a lower government debt, the government
could lower marginal tax rates and make firms
and households better off. Alternatively, positive
marginal tax rates on labor income may result
in efficiency losses associated with too little em-
ployment and too much unemployment. As a
result, the monetary authority may have a goal
of lowering unemployment, which it may he
able to do by generating inflation greater than
expected. Both of the these possibilities give the
monetary authority an incentive to generate in-
flation greater than expected. Firms and house-
holds, however, will expect values that are
consistent with the monetary authority’s incen-
tive to generate surprise inflation.” Other
things the same, such an incentive increases the
expected inflation rate. If higher expected infla-
tion makes households worse off, the net result
is that households can be worse off than if
some rule restricted the monetary authority’s
responses to the incentive to generate unexpect-
ed inflation.
Discretion means that the monetary authori-
ty’s future actions are not restricted. As a
result, policies that require a commitment to a
particular sequence of actions can be impossible
to implement, even if they clearly are prefera-
ble. Tf a monetary authority or a government
can commit monetary policy credibly, the net
benefits of such commitment can be positive.
leThere might be some actual redistribution of income that
made some people better off and some worse off.
Nonetheless, the gainers could pay the losers part of their
gains and still gain from this action,
“This incentive combined with firms’ and households’
responses affects the monetary authority’s actual plans.
Barro and Gordon (1983a and 1983b) show examples of
possible resulting equilibria.7
Such commitment might take the form of a law,
but it does not necessarily have to be embodied
in a law.
The Political Process as a Substi-
tute for an Explicit Rule
By imposing implicit constraints on the mone-
tary authorit , the political process itself can
substitute for an explicit rule. For example, the
Federal Reserve clearly has discretion, but mone-
tary policy is part of a political process. That
process can implicitly constrain Federal Reserve
actions just as a rule can explicitly constrain
them. Knowing that policy is determined by dis-
cretion provides no information about whether
monetary policy is the same as it would he, close
to what it would be or far away from what it
would be if it were governed by an optimal rule.
Much of the political structure in a republic is
designed to control the behavior of government
officials, regardless of whether they are elected
or appointed. In addition, the political process
can commit policy in the sense that certain poli-
cies become impossible or, to be more precise,
high-cost alternatives. Constitutional restrictions
are one explicit way of constraining behavior. If
efficiency losses associated with some set of
possible actions by the monetary authority were
a serious problem, it is plausible that curbs on
the monetary authority’s behavior, such as might
be written into the constitution, would exist.
Other less obvious aspects of the political
structure itself instead may curb any preference
for generating an inflation rate different from
that expected. It is possible that the monetary
authority’s incentives, which are determined by
the political process, reflect little or no return if
they surprise people. It also is possible that the
incentive to surprise people is sufficiently large
that it has substantial effects on the economy’s
performance. Though it would be extraordinari-
ly helpful to have good estimates of the mone-
tary authority’s incentives in the United States,
obtaining such estimates is difficult and current
estimates are incompatible and inconclusive.
FEEDBACK POLICIES AND RULES
The desirability of discretion is in large part
an issue of whether monetary authorities should
respond to the current or recent state of the
economy. A monetary authority can base its
response to the economy’s state on a rule, or it
can use discretion. Nonetheless, if the best
monetary policy responds to the state of the
economy, there can he costs of limiting the
monetary authority’s discretion. If the best
monetary policy ignores the current state of the
economy, there can be a benefit from limiting
the monetary authority’s discretion with little or
no cost. As a result, any discussion of rules and
discretion almost inevitably considers the advan-
tages and disadvantages of a monetary authority
responding to the economy’s state.
A convenient way of examining this issue is in
terms of whether feedback policies or policies
without feedback are preferable. A feedback
policy is a policy in which the actions taken de-
pend on the state of the economy. A policy to
keep the monetary base growing at a constant
rate is an example of a policy mvithout feedback.
i’he same policy with an exception for increases
in the monetary base during recessions is a
feedback policy, it allows feedback from the
state of the economy — a recession — to the
monetary base.”
The major question about feedback policies is
their effect on the economy’s behavior. The pos-
sible benefits, as well as possible perverse effects,
of a feedback policy can he illustrated without
many of the complications facing actual policy.
Consider a simple relationship between some
measure of the behavior of the economy, y, and
some pohcv instrument, m, as follows:
(1) y, = a + /Jy,, + y m, +
The variable y might be the growth rate of
nominal gross domestic product (GDP), the infla-
tion rate or some other policy target. The
lagged value of this variable, y, is included in
equation (1) to represent that the state of the
economy this period depends on its state last
period. The variable m might he open-market
purchases and sales or some other available in-
strument. The variable E, is an unpredictable
shock to yr In this equation, /3 and y are posi-
tive coefficients that indicate the response of
the variable y. to the past value of y, y,,, and
to the policy instrument me Further, a is
policy reflects to the monetary authority’s exercise of its
judgment. On the other hand, as McCallum (1987) has sug-
gested, a rule could include an explicit feedback policy.
“A feedback policy can be the outcome under discretion or
a component of a rule. Barro and Gordon (1983b) show a
feedback policy that is a result of discretion: the feedback8
the predictable component of y that is not as-
sociated with past values of y or the policy in-
strument. Even though the money stock is riot a
policy instrument in the United States today, for
simplicity suppose that yi sthe growth rate of
nominal GDP and m is the growth rate of the
money stock.
The economy, of course, is more complicated
than equation (1), but most of the arguments
for and against feedback policies can be ex-
plained in the context of this equation. Equation
(1) includes only a single variable, but this is not
a real limitation: y can be interpreted as a set
of variables. Equation (I) is assumed to be linear
and to have constant coefficients, mvhich are
possibly severe limitations largely shared by
current econometric models. A major limitation
of equation (1) is that expectations are not ex-
plicitly included. One reason for the importance
of expectations, discussed previously, is their
importance for the incentives affecting policy.
Another reason for the importance of expecta-
tions, discussed later, is that the coefficients in
an equation such as (1) reflect households’ and
firms’ expectations about policy. This depen-
dence of the coefficients on expectations affects
the actual usefulness of an equation such as (1)
for policy. For illustrative purposes though,
equation (1) suffices.
The Case for Feedback Policies
On the simplest level, the case for feedback
policies is transparent. Suppose that the coeffi-
cients in equation (1), a, /3 and y are constant
and policymakers know the values of these
coefficients. One policy without feedback would
be a constant growth rate of the money stock.
‘I’his and other policies without feedback permit
the effects of a shock, ç, to persist over time.
On the other hand, a feedback policy can
eliminate these persistent effects. If the mone-
tary authority cannot predict the shocks to
nominal CUP growth, it is not possible for the
authority to offset the initial effect of a shock.
Nonetheless, a feedback policy can offset all
continuing effects of the shocks. Such a feed-
back policy for equation (I) is
(2) nt, = __________
y
where yi s the target growth rate of nominal
income. Equation (2) is an explicit example of a
feedback policy: the lower last period’s growth
rate of nominal CUP is, the higher is this peri-
od’s growth rate of the money stock. There is
feedback from nominal GDP growth last period
to money growth this period.
Actually choosing an appropriate policy is
hardly so simple though, because amnong other
things any particular equation such as (2) as-
sumes that much more is known about the econ-
omy than is realistic. Few, if any, would argue
that knowledge about the economy is so advanced
that monetary authorities knoiv the equations
that characterize the economy’s behavior- over
time, let alone the values of the coefficients in
those equations. Suppose that the economy is
characterized by equation (1) and that monetary
policy is selected from feedback equations of
the general form of equation (2). With uncer-
tainty about the particular equations that
characterize the economy, a monetary authority
might adopt such a feedback policy as follows:
(3) m,= m’ + d(y’ —y,,).
In this equation, m is the constant growth of
the money stock that leads to nominal GDP
growth equal to the target growth rate in the
long run and 6 is a parameter characterizing
the response of money growth to deviations of
income growth from the target. if the economy
is governed by an equation something like (1), a
positive response to the observed deviation
from the target might seem likely to move the
economy toward the target more quickly than it
would get there otherwise.
An improvement in the economy’s perfor-
mance with this simple feedback policy is possi-
ble. Suppose that feedback equation (3) is
consistent with a target annual growth rate of
nominal CUP of 5 percent. Further suppose that
income growth initially is 5 percent and falls to
—5 percent in period 0 because of a shock, that
is, ~,= —10 in period t=0. With substantial per-
sistence in the economy (/3 is 0.9) and constant
money growth (no feedback), the red line in
figure i shows that the economy only gradually
returns to growth of 5 percent after a shock. A
feedback policy using equation 13) can speed up
the convergence. For example, with 6 equal to
0.9, the rapid convergence shown by the black
line occurs.
The usefulness of such feedback is the basis
of another argument against a rule. Mullineaux
(1985) and Lindsey (1986) suggest that actual
desirable policies are quite complex arid that9
Figure 1
Substantial Persistence in the Economy and Substantial Feedback
Beta = 0.9 and Delta = 0.9
Period
any desirable rule would be quite complex. If
this is true, any desirable rule might he so com-
plex that writing it down would be much more
costly than any possible benefits of having it.
‘I’he only feasible rules may be simple ones that
restrict policymakers’ responses to the econo-
my’s state, and these restrictions could worsen
the economy’s performance.
The Case Against Feedback
Policies
One interpretation of arguments against rules
based on the complexity of monetary policy
such as Mullineaux’s and Lindsey’s is that the
economy is too complex to specify a useful
model of the economy or a policy for the fu-
rum-c. If the discussion is about unspecifiahle
models, hoivever, economic analysis has little,
or more likely, nothing to contribute—all is
guesswork. In this case, it is not obvious that
judgment uninformed by economic analysis has
more value than a rule; after all, the benefits of
discretion are as speculative as the effects of
any rule.
The complexity of a desirable monetary rule
depends on what is expected of monetary poli-
cy. One objective of monetary policy might he
to prevent runs on the banking system.” Runs
on the banking system occurred at most once
every decade or two before the creation of the
Federal Reserve.’4 This suggests a low frequen-
cy of exceptional circumstances. Other possible
purposes of monetary policy, such as stabilizing
interest rates on a daily basis, may provide
more exceptional circumstances and may he
more consistent with an argument that the cir-
cumstances are so varied that a useful rule is
too complex to be worth trying to formulate it.
Whatever the frequency of exceptional cir-
cumstances, feedhack policies are not necessarily
better than policies without feedback.” Know-
ing whether a particular feedback policy im-
proves or worsens the actual behavior of the
“Phillips (1957) was the first to show this explicitly, in a
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“Indeed, this might be a major purpose of monetary policy,
a view suggested by Friedman (1959). Friedman’s more re-
cent views are presented in Friedman and Schwartz (1986).
‘4See Dwyer and Gilbert (1989).10
economy depends on detailed knowledge about
the response of the economy to different policies.
Suppose that the economy has little persistence,
for example /3 is 0.1. Then with no feedback,
the red line in figure 2 shows that the economy
returns relatively quickly to 5 percent growth
of nominal CUP growth after the same shock as
in figure 1. If the monetary authority uses the
same feedback policy as in the example in
figure 1, the oscillations shown by the black
line in figure 2 result. If the economy has little
persistence, this feedback policy makes the
economy more variable after a shock than it
would be with a policy without feedback. Uoing
something (a feedback policy) can be worse
than doing nothing (a policy with no feedback).
The importance of the possibility of worsen-
ing the economy’s behavior is magnified by the
prospect that a monetary authority with a feed-
back policy may never learn the structure of
the economy. If the economy’s behavior could
be summarized by an equation such as (1) and
the monetary authority attempted to stabilize
the economy, the effects of the policy on nomi-
nal CUP and expectations might make it impos-
sible for the monetary authority ever to converge
to correct estimates of the economy’s responses
to different monetary policies.b6 Some economists
believe that firms’ and households’ ability to
converge to a rcasonable working knowledge
about the economy is far from ensured. It is
not obvious that a monetary authority can con-
verge to knowledge about the economy when
its learning has suhstantial effects on the econo-
my’s behavior.’~
Evidence on the Value of Feed-
back Policy
What is the evidence concerning feedback
policies relative to policies without feedback? In
the context of simple equations such as (1),
some evidence about feedback policies has been
advanced recently.18 McCallum (1987) provides
some evidence that, since World War II, a sim-
ple feedback rule for targeting nominal CUP
growth would have been better than either ac-
tual policy or a constant growth rate of the
monetary base. This evidence is based on taking
an equation such as (1) and simulating it under
the alternative policies. Taylor (1985) has exa-
mined the implications of targeting nominal
CUP for the behavior of real CUP. Perhaps his
major result is that targeting nominal CUP may
have undesirable implications for fluctuations of
real CUP. Both of these analyses ai’e based on
very simple characterizations of the economy.
Whether they constitute more than preliminary
evidence is open to serious doubt.
Among other criticisms, these and other aria-
lyses of alternative policies must deal with what
sometimes is called the Lucas critique. Lucas’
(1975) gener-al point was that any evaluation of
alternative policies must carefully consider the
implications of changes in policy for expecta-
tions. Changes in policy generally change expec-
tations, and unless the changes in expectations
are handled very carefully, commonly estimated
economic models can he worse than useless in
predicting the effects of changes in policy. This
point can he illustrated in the context of equa-
tion (1). With v interpreted as nominal CUP
growth and m interpreted as money stock
growth, the St. Louis equation arid the St. Louis
model are examples of models such as equation
(1) that could be the hasis of a stahihzation poll-
cx’ such as equations (2) or (3).” Some analyses
of the St. Louis equation correctly argued that
it is not structural in the sense that the equa-
tion is likely to change if the monetary authori-
ty’s behavior changes. The estimated equation at
least partly reflects the monetary authority’s be-
“This issue of convergence is similar to the issue of conver-
gence of the economy to an equilibrium when firms’ and
households’ expectations influence the behavior of the
economy. More precisely, the issue is convergence of mar-
kets to rational expectations equilibria. Bullard (1991)
sketches this research and provides references.
‘7Dwyer (1992) shows that a standard semi-logarithmic de-
mand for money combined with equation (3) can generate
chaos, which suggests that nonconvergence can be dra-
matic. Butler (1990) provides an introduction to the
mathematics of chaos in economics.
“Lindsey (1986) reviews earlier work.
“See Andersen and Jordan (1968) and Andersen and Carl-
son (1970). Holbrook (1972) and Cooper and Fischer (1974),
among others, analyzed the implications of the St. Lcuis
equation or model for alternative shori-run stabilization poli-
cy. This has seemed ironic to some because a common te-
net of monetarism is that a rule without feedback would be
preferable to discretion or a rule with feedback. See Mayer
(1976). It is worth noting that forecasting the effects of
drastically different policies was not why the originators es-
timated the model. The force of the observation that a
monetarist model could be used for stabilization is muted
but not eliminated by recent instability in this equation, in-
stability that can be seen for example in Carlson (1986).
Variants of the St. Louis equation are not the only
representations of the economy that appear to have non-
constant coefficients over time. This instability is a well-
known aspect of large econometric models.11
Figure 2
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havior and households’ expectations of policy.
That is, the values of the coefficients (3 and y in
equation (1) reflect households’ expectations of
monetary policy. If monetary policy changes,
the values of these coefficients are likely to
change, and before the new policy is imple-
mented, it may be quite difficult to figure out
what the new values will be. Hence without large
amounts of judgment, an equation such as (1)
cannot be used to estimate the effects of radi-
cally different future policy or to formulate a
useful feedback policy.
Lucas’ point can be applied more generally
than just to simple equations such as (1). In
many so-called structural econometric models,
expected inflation appear’s in various equations
in the model and expected inflation itself is esti-
mated by an equation relating inflation to past
values of inflation. Such simple expectations
equations generally will be different for differ-
ent policies. This means that simple evaluations
of alternative policies using such structural
models are highly suspect. In any evaluation of
alternative policies, it is important to be clear
about what expectations of prior policy are built
into the model and how the model will change
with a new policy. In the current state of
knowledge, it is dubious whether such an exer-
cise can be more than broadly suggestive and
even the suggestiveness is open to doubt.
An alternative and quite likely better way to
examine the effects of feedback policies is to
compare the U.S. economy’s performance under’
different government policies. It is commonly
thought that the government began systemati-
cally using policy to stabilize the economy after
World War II and, at least to the same degree,
did not use such policies before then. Though
the conclusions are somewhat controversial, the
evidence presented by Homer and by Balke and
Gom’don suggests that the economy has been no
more stable since World War II than it was in
prior years.’°The case has yet to be made that
stabilization policy in the postwar period has
improved the economy’s performance.
SUMMARY
In the last 20 years, the terms of the debate
about rules vs. discretion have shifted dramati-
cally. At one time, it was widely believed that
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could accomplish. The monetary authority could
exercise its judgment to produce whatever poli-
cy a rule might specify in advance if the rule
were the best policy. If a deviation from the
policy that would be imposed by the rule were
desirable, the monetary authority’s hands would
not be tied if it had discretion. The following is
a more general but closely related line of argu-
ment: A rule is a constraint, and, in general,
constraints make it impossible to accomplish
what could be done otherwise.
It now is understood that rules can have
benefits precisely because they restrict future
policy choices. The mere possibility that a rnone-
tary authority will take sonic action can affect
households’ expectations and the effects on ex-
pectations can have negative effects on the econ-
omy’s performance. Furthermore, some policies
depend on committing future policy actions, and
leaving judgment in the monetai’y authority’s
hands restricts the monetary authority’s ability
to pursue policies that require commitment.
A judgment about the desirability of rules or
discretion hinges in part on judgments about
how much control over monetary policy should
he given to appointed officials arid their ad-
visers. Some proposed rules for the monetary
authority leave some discretion. For example,
with a rule that the monetary authority keep
the price level constant, the monetary authority
could exercise substantial judgment about the
best means of reaching this end. Nonetheless,
even if some discretion remains, there can be a
positive return from committing policy. The size
of the actual gain in any particular country
from committing monetary policy by a law, a
constitutional t-estriction or a similar device de-
pends fundamentally on how much incentive a
monetary authority has to generate surprise in-
flation and how much commnitment is implicit in
the country’s political process.
Judgments about rules vs. discretion and
whether a monetary authority should m’espond
to the state of the economy also hinge on what
can reasonably be expected from monetary poli-
cy given current knowledge about the economy.
Responding to the state of the economy can he
destabilizing; doing something can indeed he
worse than doing nothing. Though many at-
tempts have been made to estimate the effects
of feedback polices and rules, estimating the ef-
fects of monetary policy on an economy’s actual
behavior’ is tricky. Besides the difficulties as-
sociated with attempting to specify a model of
the economy adequately, estimates of expecta-
tions in a very different environment are re-
quired. It is dubious whether the effects of
feedback policies and various rules estimated to
date provide more than broadly suggestive
evidence.
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